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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing upon the long established stream of agency theory literature, this research investigates 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs before the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thus questioning the rationale and assumptions made in this 
legislation. Investigating domestic, manufacturing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
this research concludes that many governance controls long held to temper agency conflict did not 
do so in a pre-SOX environment. Therefore, it is incumbent upon researchers to determine what 
caused these mechanisms to fail before the passage of SOX. If researchers do not learn from the 
mistakes of the past and help business understand how they occurred, these mistakes will repeat 
themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this research was to assess the effectiveness of governance mechanisms long-held to 
temper agency costs. Specifically, this research focused on domestic firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the manufacturing industry in a pre-Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
environment.  
 
Corporate governance can be defined as a process which delineates “the relationship between a company’s 
shareholders, directors, and management as defined by the corporate charter, bylaws, formal policy, and rule of law” 
(Gallegos, 2004, p. 37). As noted by Radin and Stevenson (2006), “[c]orporate governance for publicly traded 
companies is based on the principle that boards are empowered and guided by the law including the Securities Act 
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act or 1934, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” (p. 367). It is clear that the 
requirements of SOX (in addition to other securities laws) attempt to improve the monitoring and bonding activities 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as elements to reducing agency costs. The purpose of this research is to 
assess the effectiveness of corporate governance in limiting agency costs in U.S. manufacturing firms listed on the 
NYSE before the passage of SOX. 
 
Drawing on the long standing stream of literature established by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983b), the purpose of this research is to assess the need for SOX at the time of its passage from an agency 
cost perspective. In doing so, this research reviews the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms before the 
passage of SOX.  In doing so, this research will determine if improvement was needed in this area before SOX was 
passed.  
 
This research provides evidence that governance devices long-held to mitigate agency costs were, for the 
most part, not effective before the passage of SOX and the need for improvement (and possibly regulation) was 
necessary. It is not the purpose of this research to assess the efficacy of SOX on improving the effectiveness of these 
governance mechanisms. Rather, as it is oft said that we must learn from history or it is destined to repeat itself, this 
research is meant to investigate whether these governance mechanisms were effective before the passage of SOX 
T 
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and, if not, make a call of further research into the reasons for this result. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Using a series of univariate and multivariate regression analyses, this research assesses how the change in 
agency costs from before the passage of SOX through a period after its passage drawing on two common and proven 
measures of agency cost as outlined by Ang, Cole, and Lin (1999) and further developed by Singh and Davidson 
(2003). Consistent with the methodology used by Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh (2006), a baseline of agency costs 
incurred by the firms in the sample was determined using the fiscal year before the passage of SOX was regressed 
against variables commonly regarded to cause or mitigate agency conflicts. In doing so, the effectiveness of these 
governance mechanisms on agency costs during the period of interest will be assessed. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 This study, consistent with Botosan (1997), is limited by the fact that the sample used in this study included 
manufacturing firms in the following SIC codes: 3310-3600. Therefore, the results of this study may only be 
representative of issues unique to the manufacturing industry and further study beyond this industry may be 
necessary to impute broader application of this research. Additionally, due to characteristics related to foreign 
filings, this study was limited to domestic companies in the data set for the SIC codes selected. In addition, due to 
the different governance requirements imposed by the various stock exchanges, only firms listed on the NYSE were 
used.  
 
 As with any statistical study, this study included the risk of a type I (or α) and type I (or β) errors (Stock & 
Watson, 2007; Gujarati, 2003). Specifically, a type I error (also referred to as an α error or false positive) is one 
where the model erroneously rejects the null hypothesis which in fact should not be rejected. Put differently, a type I 
error is one where the independent variables are shown to impact the dependent variable when, in fact, they did not. 
A type II error (also referred to as a β error or false negative) is one where the model erroneously fails to reject the 
null hypothesis when in fact it should be rejected. More specifically, a type II error is one where the independent 
variables are found not to impact the dependent variable when, in fact, they do.  
 
It was anticipated, however, that despite these limitations, this research contributes to the streams of 
literature on agency costs. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While Berle and Means (1932) first introduced the concept of separation of ownership and control stating 
“[a]s the ownership of corporate wealth has become more widely dispersed, ownership of that wealth and control 
over it have come to lie less and less in the same hands” (p. 69); it was Jensen and Meckling (1976) who modeled 
the theory illustrating that as a manager’s ownership in the firm declined, the manager had the propensity to take 
non-pecuniary benefits which are not beneficial to the firm but generate utility to the manager. Fama (1980) noted 
“[e]conomists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is 
the province of managers who are not the firm’s security holders” (p. 288). Jensen and Meckling defined the agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons – the principal(s) – engage another person – the agent – 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (p. 
3). These are, as Fama noted, contracts among factors of production. The purpose of bringing these elements of 
production together on a contractual basis is to achieve cooperation among specialists to achieve productivity for the 
resource owners (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Fama described the relationships in the firm as a series of contracts 
citing Alchian and Demsetz who stated: 
 
The essence of the classical firm is identified here as contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several 
input owners; 3) one party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; 4) who has the right to renegotiate 
any input’s contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 5) who holds the residual claim; and 6) 
who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. The central agent is called the firm’s owner and the 
employer. (Alchian & Demsetz, p. 794). 
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The costs associated with the agency relationship can be classified into three categories, according to 
Jensen and Meckling (1976): monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual loss. Monitoring costs include costs of 
observing the actions of the agent as well as costs to control the agent’s behavior through auditing, internal controls, 
policies and procedures, and restrictions (such as budgets).
1
 Due to their large influence and risk in the firm, Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000) noted that large blockholders often fulfill a monitoring role for publicly held corporations since 
they have the greatest to gain from such monitoring (Holderness & Sheehan, 1985; Barclay & Holderness, 1991). 
Additionally, creditors may incur monitoring costs to protect their investment in the firm, particularly when the 
creditors have significant amounts lent to the firm (Ang et al.). In doing so, the creditor is ensuring the firm is 
operating efficiently and utilizing assets effectively (thus controlling the consumption of perquisites by 
management). This is particularly important, Ang et al. noted, in a highly leveraged firm where the risk of default is 
higher, increasing the incentive to monitor. 
 
Bonding costs include costs associated with providing assurance to outside owners that the manager’s 
activity related to taking benefits from the company are limited and take the form of audits by public accounting 
firms, fiduciary bonds (i.e. insurance), and limitations placed on the manager’s authority though the contract 
between the firm and the manager (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
The residual loss is defined as the difference between the value to the firm if the manager acted in the best 
interest of the firm and the decisions the manager ultimately makes (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and include “social 
and private costs of an agent’s actions due to incomplete alignment of the agent’s and owner’s interests” (Ang et al., 
2000).
2
 These decisions have been shown to include capital structure, maturity structure, dividend policy, and 
executive compensation (Ang et al.). According to Jensen and Meckling, the residual loss occurs because 
management has incentive to consume perquisites
3
 from the firm. When a manager consumes these perquisites the 
manager benefits from 100% of their value. While the manager may have some ownership interest in the firm, the 
manager’s loss of profit from this consumption is equal to his or her ownership percentage in the firm times the 
value of the perquisite consumed. The cost to the remaining shareholders, however, is 1-
percentage of the firm the manager owns). Therefore, the less ownership interest held by the manager, the greater 
the benefit of the consumption of the perquisite to the manager and the greater the loss to the remaining 
shareholders. 
 
The following sections investigate the recent literature which has set out to empirically and directly probe 
the theories outlined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980).  
 
Agency Costs and Private Companies 
 
While Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theories have been largely accepted and widely researched, Ang et al. 
(2000) maintain that “the actual measurement of the principal variable of interest, agency costs, in both absolute and 
relative terms, has lagged behind” (p. 81). The reason for this lack of measurement of agency costs has largely been 
attributed to the difficulty in measuring agency costs (particularly residual loss) and inability to use a zero-agency-
cost firm as a point of comparison (Davidson, Bouresli, & Singh, 2006). Ang, et al., using information from 
National Survey of Small Business Finances, test Jensen and Meckling’s as well as Fama’s (1980) theories to 
determine whether the agency problem is more than mere theory. In doing so, Ang et al. sample 1,708 small 
                                                 
1 Competition also makes it necessary to monitor the performance of the management team and individuals (Fama, 1980). 
2 The manager may be motivated to make decisions which do not maximize firm value. This case occurs when the manager 
makes a decision which benefits the manager (financially or non-financially) which is not the optimal decision to maximize firm 
value. Fama (1980) noted that this divergence of ownership and management creates a situation where the manager, whose 
motivations may not be parallel with the owners, has little resemblance to Adam Smith’s “economic man.” Not only do these 
decisions involve those which result in consumption of perquisites, but also those that result in the shirking of responsibility 
(Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). However, if the manager is consuming perquisites to maximize the manager’s overall utility that may 
be interpreted as exemplifying Adam Smith’s “economic man.” 
3 Ellig (2005) noted that perquisites (often referred to as “perks”) are a form of compensation that separates top level executives 
from those below them in the firm. They are often not performance based and create a two class system between the executives 
and other employees which is contrary to dominant corporate philosophies which stress teamwork in the workplace. Perquisites 
are a form of compensation which is an extension of and beyond that of the normal benefit package.  
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corporations. The use of closely-held, private companies allows the researchers to obtain a data sample that includes 
both firms completely owned by owners
4
 and firms in which managers did not own the entire firm, allowing them to 
apply Jensen and Meckling’s theory in a setting which includes characteristics consistent with the assumptions made 
in their 1976 work. To measure agency costs, the researchers use two ratios: an expense ratio and an efficiency ratio. 
The expense ratio is used to measure how effectively management controls costs, including the consumption of 
perquisites by management (and, thus residual loss to the shareholders). This ratio is defined in Ang et al.’s research 
as total expenses less cost of goods sold, interest expense and management compensation divided by total sales. The 
efficiency ratio is total sales divided by total assets (commonly known as the asset turnover ratio). This ratio is used 
to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of management’s deployment and use of firm assets as well as creditor’s 
incentives to monitor. Ang et al. argue a firm will have positive agency costs when the expense ratio is higher due to 
greater discretionary expenditures or the efficiency ratio is lower due to poor investment decisions or inefficient 
effort by management. Alternatively, such a situation occur when a firm experiences lower revenues or management 
consumed perquisites or purchased inefficient assets for the firm, such as lavish office space, office furnishing, 
automobiles, or resort properties.  
 
Using the expense-to-sales ratio and the asset turnover ratio as dependent variables in identical, but 
separate, regressions, Ang et al. (2000) perform univariate and multivariate regression analyses using ownership and 
external monitoring variables. They find that the expense-to-sales ratio is higher and the asset turnover ratio is lower 
for firms with higher levels of outside ownership than for firms with lower levels of outside ownership. These 
results directly and empirically supported the theories espoused by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983a) that agency costs are, indeed, higher when there is greater outside ownership and lower management 
ownership. 
 
Agency Costs and Public Companies 
 
Singh and Davidson (2003) extend Ang et al.’s (2000) research to the publicly held company arena with 
complementary findings. Extending the concept of managerial ownership used by Ang et al., Singh and Davidson 
also investigate the role of outside block ownership on agency costs and control for the size and composition of the 
board of directors to control for the use of alternative governance mechanisms by corporations as indicated by 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). Singh and Davidson use asset turnover to “relate absolute levels of asset utilization 
efficiencies” by management (p. 794). In addition, they modify the expense ratio used by Ang et al. Specifically, 
they argued that selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by net sales is a good proxy for agency costs. 
Unlike Ang et al., Singh and Davidson focused on selling, general, and administrative expense as they represented 
“the costs related to the management function and to the sale of products, including managerial salaries, rents, 
insurance, utilities, supplies, and advertising costs” (p. 794). They noted that as these costs increased management 
consumption of perquisites in terms of lavish expenditures on offices and support services were captured. Davidson 
et al. (2006) argue the relevance of leaving management compensation in the ratio, arguing excessive pay was an 
agency cost just like the consumption of perquisites. Since selling, general, and administrative expenses largely 
reflect discretionary expenditures by managers, Singh and Davidson argue it is a closer proxy for agency costs than 
the Ang et al. proxy. In addition, Singh and Davidson introduce an independent variable for outside blockholders 
arguing that these blockholders “may be instrumental in generating superior corporate performance” (p. 796). 
 
Davidson et al. (2006) put Ang et al.’s agency cost measures (efficiency and expense ratios) to the test in 
public companies in an initial public offering (IPO) setting. Specifically, they ask whether “going public increase or 
alleviate the agency problem and how various deterrent mechanisms influence agency costs” (p. 88). They used 
asset turnover as a measure of agency costs arguing asset turnover would be lower when agency conflicts are higher. 
Consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003), they modify the expense ratio used by Ang et al. They argued that 
selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by net sales is a better proxy for agency costs. Using IPOs as 
                                                 
4 This research does not recognize nor acknowledge that firms owned by managers suffer a unique form of agency costs 
influenced by the tax code. While, under Jensen and Meckling’s theory, as a manager’s ownership increases, the manager’s 
incentive to take perquisites from the firm is reduced, it can be argued that, particularly in firms owned solely by managers, 
managers may attempt to remove pecuniary benefits which are personal in nature from the firm under the guise of business 
expenses to reduce the overall tax burden to the manager. 
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their event of interest, Davidson et al. investigate 293 IPO firms and use similar regression equations to Ang et al. in 
the year before the IPO and the year after the IPO. They did not include the year of the IPO since that year would 
include significant noise due to the fact that part of the year the firm would have been private and part of the year the 
firm would have been public. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
In the previous section, a review of the literature related to agency costs. This section develops hypotheses 
and a model to test whether certain variables found by the literature to affect U.S. firms’ agency costs prior to the 
passage of this comprehensive legislation were doing so during the period before the passage of SOX. 
. 
Sample Selection 
 
 In evaluating the impact of disclosure levels on the cost of equity capital, Botosan (1997) notes it is 
important to choose one industry as disclosure patterns varied among industries. Specifically, she notes that firms in 
the pharmaceuticals industry would be more likely to make more transparent disclosures about research and 
development activities than firms in other industries (p. 327). Additionally, Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) note that there 
are significant differences in agency costs among industries. Therefore, to prevent the influence of industry factors, a 
single industry is used in this study. Consistent with Botosan’s argument, it is argued that different industries may 
allow for different levels of agency costs. This is acknowledged by Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), Singh and Davidson 
(2003), and Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh (2006) when each controlled for industry effects in their studies. 
Therefore, given Botosan’s argument that an intra-industry sample would be appropriate, this research used the same 
broadly defined manufacturing industry with SIC codes 3310-3600.
5
 The use of these manufacturing industry codes 
allowed for the one measure of agency cost (selling, general, and administrative expense) to be more likely to focus 
on the perquisites desired in the analysis below as this measure was more likely to include discretionary 
expenditures.  
 
 Consistent with Leuz’s (2007) observation that U.S. exchanges have differing governance standards and 
have experienced changes in each exchange’s respective governance standards over the period of interest, the use of 
one exchange allowed for controlling for this change. Therefore, the firms selected were firms listed on the NYSE 
for the entirety of the event window. This constraint allowed the results to be read with an understanding of the 
governance requirements of this exchange on these firms relative to the governance variables examined. 
 
MODEL 
 
 This study uses univariate and multivariate regression with two dependent variables as proxies for agency 
costs in two separate regressions using the same independent variables. Consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003) 
and Davidson et al.’s (2006) revision of the proxies developed and proven by Ang et al. (2000), the dependent 
variables used to proxy for agency costs was sales divided by total assets (asset turnover) and selling, general, and 
administrative expense as a percentage of sales. Following closely the work of Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh 
(2006), this study investigated firms in the manufacturing industry using the following model to measure the impact 
of the governance mechanisms of interest on agency costs: 
 
ATO = 0 + 1CEO + 2BH + 3BOARD + 4DIR + 5LEV + 6ASSETS + 7AUDIT +  
SGA = 0 + 1CEO + 2BH + 3BOARD + 4DIR + 5LEV + 6ASSETS + 7 AUDIT +  
 
The variables in this model are presented in Table 1. Consistent with Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson 
(2003), and Davidson et al. (2006), each dependent variable was regressed with each independent variable in a 
univariate regression to determine the impact of each individual independent variable with a final multivariate 
                                                 
5 Botosan (1997) did not use the entire range, arguing “[e]lectronic components manufactures (SIC codes 3571-3579) are 
excluded because their disclosure practices may be influenced by the high technology nature of these firms which is quite 
different from the other firms included in the analysis” (p. 327). Given that this research does not use disclosure level as a 
component of the research, leaving this range out of the sample would not have been appropriate. 
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analysis including all the independent variables. Analysis was performed to test the assumption normality of the 
residuals of the regression through the preparation and review of the related histograms.  
 
 
Table 1: Variables to be used in Data Analysis 
 
Dependent Variables 
   ATO = asset turnover (net sales ÷ total assets) 
   SGA = selling, general, and administrative expense ÷ net sales 
 
Independent Variables 
   CEO = CEO ownership as a percentage of all voting shares outstanding 
   BH = blockholder ownership as a percentage of all voting shares outstanding 
   BOARD = size of the board of directors (number of directors) 
   DIR = outside directors as a percentage of all directors 
   LEV = leverage (total debt ÷ total assets) 
   AUDIT = audit fees as a percentage of net sales 
 
Control Variables 
   ASSETS = log10 of total asset 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
 As explained in Table 1, each of the dependent variables is used as a single dependent variable in univariate 
and multivariate regression analyses using identical independent variables known to impact agency costs. 
 
  Asset turnover (identified as ATO in the model) was equal to net sales divided by total assets as reported by 
financial information provided by Compustat. Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh (2006); Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), and 
Singh and Davidson (2003) used this ratio to measure the effectiveness of management’s use of the assets of the 
firm and, therefore, a measure of agency costs. A lower asset turnover implies management has invested in 
nonproductive assets which do not generate cash flows and there is, therefore, agency conflict.  
 
Given that a higher asset turnover indicates efficient use of firm assets, a positive coefficient on any of the 
independent variables when regressed against asset turnover (ATO) indicates a positive impact on the dependent 
variable and, thus, a decrease in agency costs (since the positive impact would increase the efficiency with which the 
firm utilized its assets). Conversely, a negative coefficient on any of the independent variables indicates a negative 
impact on the dependent variable and an increase in agency costs (since the negative impact decreases the efficiency 
with which the firm utilized its assets). 
 
 Selling, general, and administrative expense as a percentage of net sales (identified as SGA in the model) is 
a ratio which uses total selling, general, and administrative expenses and net sales as reported by financial 
information provided by Compustat. This variable is expressed as a percentage. The use of a percentage allows this 
variable to be a relative measure which is, therefore, standardized among various sized firms. A positive coefficient 
on any of the independent variables when regressed against selling, general, and administrative expense as a 
percentage of net sales (SGA) indicates an increase in the expense ratio, which is argued to indicate an increase in 
discretionary expenditures, thus demonstrating an increase in agency costs. A negative coefficient on any of the 
independent variables would indicate a decrease in the expense ratio which, by virtue of the decrease in 
discretionary expenditures illustrated thereby, illustrates a reduction in agency costs. 
 
 The regression analysis focuses on agency theory as widely documented in prior literature. These tests 
involved evaluating the statistical significance of the coefficients of each independent variable to determine if each 
behaves in the model above consistent with agency theory as outlined by Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory of 
the firm and its progeny. 
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Independent Variables 
 
Agency Costs and Management Ownership. One basic tenet of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory is that the 
separation of ownership and control creates a divergence of interests between the owner and the manager. The 
alignment of management ownership and the interest of owners are keys to their argument that there is a positive 
relationship between management ownership and firm performance (Davidson et al., 2006). Therefore, as noted by 
DeFond (1992), “the greater the ownership interest of the manager, the more closely aligned his or her preferences 
are with those of the outside owners” (p. 21). Fama (1980) notes that owners, as the risk bearers, place a bond on 
their performance by investing funds up front. Owners, therefore, cannot protect themselves individually from these 
losses, while managers did not have this pecuniary risk outside of the risk of the loss of their employment. While 
Davidson et al. find support for a positive relationship between management ownership and firm performance, Singh 
and Davidson (2003) find support for a positive relationship between management ownership and asset utilization 
but not for management ownership with excess discretionary expenses.Chief executive officer ownership (identified 
as CEO in the model) is used as a measure of total votes possessed by the CEO expressed as a percentage of the total 
voting rights in the firm. Brunarski, Harman and Kehr (2004) and Borokhovich, Brunarski, Haman and Kehr (2005) 
use this as a measure of the disparity of ownership between managers and outside owners, a direct application of the 
theory espoused by Jensen and Meckling (1976) while Davidson et al. (2006) and Francis and Wilson (1988) use a 
form of this variable by measuring ownership by various managers and directors. For purposes of this study, the 
more recent variation using the top manager is used.  
 
Consistent with Brunarski et al. (2004), the CEO was defined as the individual with the title of chief 
executive officer, president, or chairman of the board of directors with the highest level of direct compensation as 
reported in the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Annual Report (Form 10K). As anticipated by Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) theory of the firm, it is hypothesized that the greater the management ownership of the firm, the 
less incentive to obtain pecuniary benefits from the firm. This first hypothesis is expressed as follows: 
 
H1 = Agency costs will be inversely related to CEO ownership. 
 
Agency Costs and Blockholders. Ang et al. (2000) note that monitoring costs created a free-rider problem which can 
cause the agency problem to increase. While some interested parties (whether it be shareholders or creditors) 
monitor the activities of management, non-monitoring parties enjoy the full benefit of the monitoring. Therefore, 
while more interested parties wait for other parties to engage in monitoring behavior, agency costs increase due to 
the lack of or insufficient monitoring. However, due to their large influence and risk in the firm, Ang et al. note that 
large blockholders often fulfill a monitoring role for publicly held corporations since they have the greatest to gain 
from such monitoring (Holderness & Sheehan, 1985; Barclay & Holderness, 1991).  
 
A blockholder is any shareholder who holds an interest of five percent (5%) or more of the outstanding 
shares of stock of the firm. An outside blockholder is one who is not an officer or director of the firm nor a relative 
of an officer or director. Many researchers have found a positive relationship between the presence of outside 
blockholders and firm performance (Shome & Singh, 1995; Allen & Phillips, 2000; Bethel, Liebeskind, & Opler, 
1998). However, Sing and Davidson (2003) found little support for the same proposition. 
 
Ownership by blockholders (identified as BH in the model) is defined as total votes of outside shareholders 
with common stock ownership of five percent or more (blockholders) expressed as a percentage of the total voting 
rights in the firm. Brunarski et al. (2004), Borokhovich et al. (2005), and Davidson et al. (2006) use blockholder 
ownership as a proxy for the monitoring ability of shareholders based on the previous research indicating that 
blockholders have a greater interest in monitoring management’s behavior to reduce agency costs (see Holderness & 
Sheehan, 1985; Barclay & Holderness, 1991). The theory indicates the greater the presence of large blockholders the 
greater control, and hence monitoring power, the blockholders have. Therefore, it is hypothesized these blockholders 
exert this control and monitoring capability in an attempt to reduce agency costs. This hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
 
H2 = Agency costs are inversely related to blockholder ownership. 
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Agency Costs and Board of Directors. Fama (1980) notes that the ultimate internal monitor of the firm was the 
board of directors. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argued that outsiders on the board were “the first line of defense in 
monitoring managers and guarding shareholder’s interests” (Davidson et al., 2006, p. 89). Various studies have 
found support for the notion that outside directors were more effective monitors of management (Coughlan & 
Schmidt, 1985; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). It might be argued the major securities 
exchanges in the U.S. concur with this result given that most require a majority of the board membership to be 
independent. However, Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) found little 
evidence of a relationship between board composition and firm performance and Singh and Davidson (2003) find no 
relationship between independent outsiders on the board and a reduction in agency costs. Yet Borokhovich, 
Brunarski, Harman and Kehr (2005) find that the presence of board independence, not its magnitude, is relevant to 
shareholders when a firm experiences dividend surprises. 
 
Singh and Davidson (2003) investigate the impact of board size on agency costs, concluding that smaller 
boards protected shareholders from agency costs and larger boards were associated with efficiency losses. They 
argue that board size and composition is a complement or substitute for ownership structure on the performance of 
the firm. However, Singh and Davidson acknowledge the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1973; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1992) which indicates a larger board yields benefits from the diversity and broader resource base presented 
by a larger size, yet they fail to find support for this argument. 
 
Board size (identified as BOARD in the model) is defined as the number of board members as disclosed in 
the SEC Form 10K. Brunarski et al. (2004) and Borokhovich et al. (2005) use board size as a proxy for the 
monitoring strength of the board of directors and its impact on agency costs. Research suggests as a board increased 
in size, there is more oversight over the firm’s management. The greater oversight, the less likely agency costs 
would be present (Pfeffer, 1973; Pearce & Zahra, 1992). However, Singh and Davidson (2006) find that firms with 
larger boards are less effective in their monitoring role. Yet, this result is contrary to the accepted theory. This leads 
to the third hypothesis using the generally accepted theory on board size: 
 
H3 = Agency costs are inversely related to board size. 
 
 Outside directors (identified as DIR in the model) are all directors who are not affiliated with the firm, 
either as members of management or other employees, former employees, or family members of employees. 
Davidson et al. (2006), Brunarski et al. (2004), Borokhovich et al. (2005), and Belden, Fister and Knapp (2005) use 
outside directors to proxy for the independence of the board of directors and its propensity to better control 
management’s consumption of perquisites. This variable is calculated as a percentage of total board of directors 
from the SEC Form 10K for each year of interest. Therefore, the next hypothesis was expressed as follows: 
 
H4 = Agency costs will be inversely related to the proportion of outside directors. 
 
Agency Costs and Financial Leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that managers may not only transfer wealth 
from owners but also from creditors. Therefore, as debt increases, there is a greater opportunity for this wealth 
transfer to take place. As debt increases, managers are constrained and there are fewer resources from which 
managers could consume perquisites (Davidson et al. 2006). DeFond (1992) notes that it is common for debt 
instruments to include restrictions which will reduce the propensity for this residual loss (i.e. a bonding mechanism) 
(see also Singh & Davidson, 2003). In addition, the cost of the debt (in the form of interest), increases expenses and, 
therefore, reduces the cash flow available for management to spend on pecuniary benefits. 
 
 The degree of leverage (identified as LEV in the model) incurred by the firm was calculated as total debt 
divided by total assets from information reported by Compustat. Davidson et al. (2006), Brunarski et al. (2004) and 
Francis and Wilson (1988) used financial leverage to proxy for the availability of funds with which management can 
make discretionary expenditures for their own benefit. Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) noted that firms with 
a lower debt to equity ratio (and, therefore, a higher leverage ratio) may disclose more in their financial statements 
than firms with higher ratios. These firms were more likely to be monitored by their creditors, thereby reducing 
agency costs. In addition, since managers of firms with greater debt may be more constrained to use a firm’s cash on 
discretionary expenditures for perquisites, there was typically a negative relationship between leverage and agency 
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costs. Given the theory used by Davidson et al., Brunarski et al., and Francis and Wilson and supported by Khanna 
et al. that higher leverage decreases the prevalence of agency costs, boards will use capital structure to control 
agency costs by maintaining certain levels of leverage to deter management from obtaining perquisites from the firm 
(Dallas, 1996). This led to the fifth hypothesis tested in this research: 
 
H5 = Agency costs are inversely related to the degree of leverage within the firm. 
 
Control Variables 
 
Agency Costs and Firm Size. Following Davidson et al. (2006) and Francis and Wilson (1988), both of whom 
controlled for the size of the firm, the log10 of assets will be used to control for the size of the firm (identified as 
ASSETS in the model). Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) noted that firm size can result in economies of scale. While Ang 
et al. did not use a control for firm size because they were working with small corporations and such a control was 
deemed unnecessary they did find that there were economies of scale in the expense-to-sales ratio when regressed 
against firm sales. Singh and Davidson (2003) noted that the log form is customarily used on non-negative variables 
that are characterized by large variances.  
 
Agency Costs and Audit Fees. Neither Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and its progeny nor other literature studying the 
agency problem (e.g. Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman & Kehr, 2005; DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988) 
include audit fees in their models addressing and analyzing the agency problem. In response to the agency problem 
that can actually be caused by the hiring of the audit firm (Gavious, 2007) it was determined that outflows related to 
the agency conflict (whether monitoring or bonding) should be included in the model to control for known agency 
costs which can be measured (i.e. the bonding cost associated with an independent audit). Therefore, audit fees are 
added to the models as a control variable to determine if a model including audit fees would more appropriately 
specify the effect of the governance mechanisms on agency costs. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of this research was to determine whether governance variables moderated agency conflict 
before the passage of SOX; drawing broadly on agency theory as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) and the progeny of their work as well as the more recent work of Ang, Cole, and Lin 
(2000); Singh and Davidson (2003); and Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh (2006).  
 
DATA 
 
The initial data collected for this research was collected from Compustat for the fiscal year prior to the 
passage of SOX (July 31, 2001 to June 30, 2002). A compilation of all companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) with SIC Codes of 3310 to 3600 was requested. From this request, data on 133 companies were 
obtained as the initial sample. For each company, the information listed in Table 2 was requested from Compustat. 
The information was compiled in a Microsoft Excel 2007 spreadsheet. 
 
 
Table 2: Data obtained from Compustat 
 
Fiscal Year End 
Total Assets 
Total Debt 
Net Sales 
Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses 
Audit Fees 
SIC Code 
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From this data, the following variables were calculated: 
 
 Asset turnover (ATO) was calculated by dividing net sales by total assets. 
 Log10 of assets (ASSETS) was calculated using the logarithm function in Microsoft Excel 2007. 
 Leverage (LEV) was calculated by dividing total debt by total assets. 
 Selling, general, and administrative expense as a percentage of net sales (SGA) was calculated by dividing 
selling, general, and administrative expense by net sales. 
 Audit Fees (AUDIT) was calculated as a percentage of net sales. 
 
Once the list of companies in the preliminary data set was determined, additional data was collected 
manually. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) annual report pursuant to section 13 and 15(d) (Form 10-K) 
or Annual and transition report of foreign private issuers pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) (Form 20-F), as 
appropriate, was pulled from the SEC website (www.sec.gov) for each year within the event window for each 
company listed in the sample provided by Compustat. When appropriate, information was obtained from the annual 
proxy statement (DEF 14A) when incorporated by reference in the Form 10-K. The data collected from the annual 
SEC filings for each company is presented in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
From this information, the following variables were calculated for each year: 
 
 The percentage of outside directors as a percentage of the total board of directors (DIR) was calculated by 
dividing the total outside directors by the total board members. 
 The percentage of blockholder ownership (BH) was calculated by dividing the total voting shares owned by 
outside blockholders by the total voting shares outstanding. 
 The percentage of CEO ownership (CEO) was calculated by dividing the total voting shares owned by the 
chief executive officer, president, or chairman of the board with the highest level of compensation by the 
total voting shares outstanding. 
 
The data points analyzed for this research are summarized in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Variables to be used in Data Analysis 
Dependent Variables 
   ATO = asset turnover (net sales ÷ total assets) 
   SGA = selling, general, and administrative expense ÷ net sales 
 
Independent Variables 
   CEO = CEO ownership as a percentage of all voting shares outstanding 
   BH = blockholder ownership as a percentage of all voting shares outstanding 
   BOARD = size of the board of directors (number of directors) 
   DIR = outside directors as a percentage of all directors 
   LEV = leverage (total debt ÷ total assets) 
   AUDIT = audit fees as a percentage of net sales 
 
Control Variables 
   ASSETS = log10 of total asset 
   AUDIT = audit fees as a percentage of net sales 
Table 3: Data obtained from Annual SEC Filings 
Number of directors 
Number of outside directors 
Number of voting shares outstanding 
Number of voting shares owned by outside blockholders 
Number of voting shares owned by CEO 
Country of Incorporation 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – October, 2009 Volume 7, Number 10 
25 
Data Selection 
 
After compiling the data above, it was necessary to filter the data to have construct validity. Therefore, this 
study only focused on companies registered with the SEC before and after the passage of SOX as it was important 
for future research to be able to compare these results to post-SOX results. Nineteen firms fell into the category of 
firms which had registered or withdrawn registration during this period. Of these nineteen firms, eight filed a 
registration statement (Form S-1), two filed a registration of securities issued in business combinations (Form S-4), 
four filed a registration statement of certain foreign private issuers (Form F-1), two filed a registration of securities 
by foreign private issuers in certain business combinations (form F-4), two filed a prospectus under Rule 424(b)(2) 
(Form 424B2), and one filed a registration withdrawal request (Form RW). The nineteen firms involved included 
nine domestic firms and ten foreign firms. This analysis left 114 remaining in the sample from the 133 firms which 
had been provided by Compustat. 
 
While collecting the governance and ownership data on each firm, it became apparent that many of the 
foreign firms (specifically the foreign private issuers) did not present the ownership interest of the CEO. In addition, 
the distinction between inside and outside directors was not apparent for many of the foreign firms. Given that there 
were 24 foreign firms in the data set and many of the firms did not present CEO ownership and/or the independence 
of the board was not readily determinable, and considering that ten of the firms had filed the initial registration 
during the window discussed above, it was determined that the best results would be obtained by focusing on only 
domestic firms to prevent any outliers that might occur due to differing regulatory requirements for foreign firms 
(not only SOX requirements, but more specifically, NYSE listing requirements). Given that ten firms had filed an 
initial registration after the start of the event period, the net reduction in the sample resulting from focusing the study 
to domestic firms was 14 firms. Therefore, only the 100 domestic firms were left in the sample. 
 
In addition, there were two firms for which the full complement of Compustat data was not available. It 
was deemed imprudent to include these firms in the data set as determining the data points from the filings would 
amount to conjecture given that some data points for other reported firms could not be tied directly to the filings. 
One of these firms had already been eliminated above, therefore, the net reduction in the sample size was one 
domestic firm from this analysis. This resulted in a total of 99 firms in the remaining sample. 
 
Finally, this study evinced that the inclusion of audit fees as a percentage of net sales in the model would be 
an appropriate extension of the model developed by Ang et.al (2000) and to control for its impact on agency costs. 
Given that four firms did not report audit fees for the year before SOX was passed, these firms could not be included 
in the model. This resulted in a total of 95 firms (n = 95) in the final sample used for the remainder of the study. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Year Before the Passage of SOX 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Dependent Variables
ATO 1.096 0.402 1.039 0.211 3.379
SGA 0.188 0.104 0.175 0.003 0.770
Independent Variables
CEO 0.036 0.078 0.012 0.000 0.493
BH 0.221 0.184 0.186 0.000 0.853
BOARD 8.800 2.587 9.000 4.000 18.000
DIR 0.768 0.140 0.800 0.286 0.929
LEV 0.280 0.180 0.268 0.000 1.441
AUDIT 0.072% 0.055% 0.056% 0.008% 0.315%
ASSETS 3.089 0.570 3.077 1.833 4.513
Net Sales (in millions) 3,103.88 6,007.81 1,235.42 70.09 45,226.00
Total Assets (in millions) 3,281.06 6,460.13 1,193.77 68.07 32,584.00
Firm Size
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first step in evaluating the data for the model developed above was to assess the data collected by 
calculating the descriptive statistics. For all the variables described below, there were 95 observations (n = 95). 
Descriptive statistics were calculated using SPSS 15.0 for Windows statistical software.  
 
The data from the 95 firms was for the fiscal year before the passage of SOX. Therefore, firm years ended 
between July 31, 2001 and July 30, 2002 were used. The descriptive statistics for the year are presented in Table 5. 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Correlation Results 
 
As presented in above, the data collected was analyzed in two multivariate regression equations (one 
regression for each of the two dependent variables using the same regressors). Before regression analysis took place, 
the data was analyzed for high degrees of bivariate correlation between the dependent and independent variables. 
Correlation analysis allows the researcher to test for the potential for perfect or imperfect multicollinearity between 
the variables. The next section discusses the results of this analysis. 
 
 
Table 6: Asset Turnover Correlation Matrix 
 
ATO CEO BH BOARD DIR LEV ASSETS AUDIT
ATO 1.000
CEO 0.039 1.000
BH -0.149 -0.126 1.000
BOARD 0.079 -0.161 -0.364 1.000
DIR 0.138 -0.329 0.149 0.121 1.000
LEV -0.144 -0.099 0.262 -0.084 0.081 1.000
ASSETS -0.199 -0.324 -0.345 0.443 0.268 0.149 1.000
AUDIT 0.1927 0.193 0.346 -0.251 -0.277 0.011 -0.493 1.000  
 
 
The results of the correlation analysis are presented in the correlation matrices in Tables 6 and 7 which 
present the Pearson product-moment correlation value (r) between each variable as calculated by SPSS 15.0 for 
Windows. Table 6 presents the correlation matrix, for the regression of the dependent variable asset turnover (ATO) 
against the independent variables in the model. Using a conservative critical value of 0.600, it was noted that there 
were no high correlation coefficients for this regression analysis. This indicated there was not a high degree of linear 
relationship (i.e. collinearity) between any two variables in the sample used for this regression analysis. Therefore 
the risk of multicollinearity was low in this multiple regression model. In fact the highest correlation was 0.443, well 
below the critical value. 
 
The correlation matrix for the regression for selling, general, and administrative expenses as a percentage 
of net sales (SGA) in the year before the passage of SOX is presented in Table 7. Again, using a critical value of 
0.600, there was no correlation coefficient which exceeded the critical value. All of the correlation coefficients 
between SGA and the independent variables are well below the critical value. Again, as the correlation coefficients 
between the independent variables were identical in both SGA and ATO, the highest correlation coefficient was 
0.443. The next highest correlation coefficient in this analysis was -0.364. Therefore, the risk of multicollinearity 
was minimal in this regression. 
 
Since the correlation analysis indicated the linear relationship between each of the independent variables 
did not give rise to a meaningful risk of multicollinearity, the next section discusses the results of the regression 
analyses run for each dependent variable for each year. 
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Table 7: SGA percentage in the Year SOX-1 Correlation Matrix 
SGA CEO BH BOARD DIR LEV ASSETS AUDIT
SGA 1.000
CEO 0.031 1.000
BH 0.134 -0.126 1.000
BOARD -0.059 -0.161 -0.364 1.000
DIR -0.150 -0.329 0.149 0.121 1.000
LEV -0.117 -0.099 0.262 -0.084 0.081 1.000
ASSETS -0.135 -0.324 -0.345 0.443 0.268 0.149 1.000
AUDIT 0.564 0.193 0.346 -0.251 -0.277 0.011 -0.493 1.000  
 
 
Regression Results 
 
The first series of regression analyses performed were those with asset turnover (ATO) as the dependent 
variable. The first step in the data analysis was to regress each independent variable in a univariate regression 
against the dependent variable and the second was to include all the independent variables in a multivariate 
regression model. It should be noted that the histograms of the residuals for each univariate and the multivariate 
analysis approached a normal distribution and were homoscedastistic and, therefore, meet these crucial assumption 
of regression analysis. 
 
The results of these univariate and multivariate tests for are summarized in Table 8. When preparing the 
univariate tests, only the control variable log10 of assets (ASSETS) (at the 5% level of confidence) and AUDIT (at 
the 10% level) were statistically significant. However, it was expected that ASSETS would be statistically 
significant given that dependent variable, asset turnover, is a function of total assets from which the ASSETS 
independent variable was derived by calculating the logarithm of total assets to the base ten (log10). The adjusted r-
squared
6
 (R
2
)
 
on the univariate analyses using the independent variables CEO ownership (CEO) and board size 
(BOARD) (both of which had coefficients which were not statistically significant) were negative indicating that, 
when these variables were used as independent variables in a univariate test and regressed against asset turnover 
(ATO), the resulting adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) was less than that which could be expected 
to occur by mere chance. 
 
When the independent variables were placed in the full regression model, however, the variables appeared 
to control for each other. The coefficient of the blockholder ownership (BH) independent variable was statistically 
significant at the 10% level of confidence. Interestingly, the coefficient was negative which was the opposite of the 
anticipated result. This decline in ATO indicated the firms utilized assets less efficiently and thus experienced an 
increase in agency costs. In addition, the level of director independence (DIR) was statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level. The coefficient of this variable was positive which was consistent with the expected result and the 
board’s monitoring role in the firm. Given that ATO increased, the firms utilized assets more efficiently and, 
therefore, agency costs declined. As anticipated, the log10 of assets (ASSETS) variable was statistically significant at 
the 1% level of confidence and had a negative effect on ATO. This was to be expected given that assets is the 
denominator of the dependent variable and, therefore, an increase in assets would cause the dependent variable to 
decline when it is above one.
7
 Additionally, as anticipated, the audit fee (AUDIT) independent variable was 
                                                 
6 Adjusted R2 was used throughout this study as the sample did not include the entire population of the data being studies. The 
adjusted R2 is a modification of the coefficient of determination (R2) and corrects the coefficient of determination (which is a 
measurement of the goodness of fit of the model) for the sample size and number of regressors. This, in turn, adjusts for the 
amount of the model that might be occurring by chance rather than as determined by the independent variables included in the 
model. While R2 is a measure of the goodness of fit, it is only the explained and unexplained variation in the dependent variable 
while not accounting for the degrees of freedom (Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 1998). As noted by Pindyk and Rubinfeld, adjusted R2 
can rise or fall with the inclusion of additional variables, thereby eliminating the incentive to add variables to simply increase the 
coefficient of determination as can occur with R2. 
7 This analysis only holds true when ATO is above one. If ATO is less than one, a decline in the denominator would cause ATO 
to increase. 
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statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence. The coefficient was negative, indicating that as audit fees 
increased, the efficiency with which the firm utilized assets declined which is contrary to the expected result. The 
adjusted R
2
 was still considerably low in the full model; however, it was higher than those in any of the univariate 
tests indicating the inclusion of the variables in the multivariate model have added to the explanatory power of the 
independent variables. In addition, the adjusted R
2
 was greater than that obtained in the Ang et al. (2000) research 
when utilizing asset turnover (ATO) as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 8: Regression Results – ATO 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.089 1.168 0.988 0.792 1.186 1.531 1.196 1.863
t-statistic 23.794 ‡ 18.121 ‡ 6.699 ‡ 3.429 ‡ 15.547 ‡ 6.797 ‡ 17.732 ‡ 5.023 ‡
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.200 -0.083
t-statistic 0.375 -0.153
p-value 0.709 0.879
-0.327 -0.478
t-statistic -1.455 -1.814
*
p-value 0.149 0.073
0.012 0.021
t-statistic 0.767 1.255
p-value 0.445 0.213
0.397 0.619
t-statistic 1.341 2.018 †
p-value 0.183 0.047
-0.321 -0.024
t-statistic -1.399 -0.107
p-value 0.165 0.915
-0.141 -0.377
t-statistic -1.963
* -4.175 ‡
p-value 0.053 0.000
-138.695 -205.157
t-statistic -1.862
* -2.456 †
p-value 0.066 0.016
-0.009 0.012 -0.004 0.008 0.010 0.029 0.026 0.172
AUDIT
‡significant at 0.01    †significant at 0.05    *significant at 0.10
CEO
Adjusted R2
Intercept
BH
BOARD
DIR
LEV
ASSETS
 
 
 
The results of these univariate and multivariate tests for the regression models with SGA as the dependent 
variable are summarized in Table 9. When preparing the univariate tests, only the audit fee (AUDIT) variable was 
statistically significant. This result is to be expected given that audit fees are part of the numerator of the dependent 
variable. The adjusted R
2
 of the CEO ownership (CEO) and board size (BOARD) variables were each negative, 
indicating that the resulting adjusted R
2
 was lower than would be expected to conclude that the regression results 
were anything different from that which might occur randomly. 
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Table 9: Regression Results – SGA in the year SOX-1 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.186 0.171 0.209 0.274 0.207 0.264 0.111 0.019
t-statistic 15.780 ‡ 10.262 ‡ 5.474 ‡ 4.601 ‡ 10.467 ‡ 4.489 ‡ 7.583 ‡ 0.215
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.830
0.041 -0.069
t-statistic 0.295 -0.540
p-value 0.769 0.591
0.076 0.010
t-statistic 1.301 0.167
p-value 0.197 0.868
-0.002 0.000
t-statistic -0.566 0.019
p-value 0.573 0.985
-0.112 -0.022
t-statistic -1.465 -0.306
p-value 0.146 0.760
-0.068 -0.095
t-statistic -1.136 -1.787
*
p-value 0.259 0.077
-0.025 0.039
t-statistic -1.314 1.857 *
p-value 0.192 0.067
106.542 126.159
t-statistic 6.592
‡ 6.466 ‡
p-value 0.000 0.000
-0.010 0.007 -0.007 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.311 0.322
AUDIT
‡significant at 0.01    †significant at 0.05    *significant at 0.10
DIR
LEV
ASSETS
Adjusted R2
BOARD
BH
CEO
Intercept
 
 
 
When the independent variables were placed in the full regression model for selling, general, and 
administrative expenses as a percentage of net sales (SGA), the independent variables did not appear to control for 
each other. The adjusted R
2
 increased very slightly from that in the AUDIT univariate model. It is noteworthy that 
the coefficient of the ASSETS, which was used in the model as control variables, was significant in only the 
multivariate model.  The audit fee (AUDIT) variable, however, was significant in the multivariate model indicating 
it was an effective control variable. The only other independent variable which was an effective moderator of 
agency costs, as measured by discretionary expenditures, was leverage (LEV) which had the expected, negative, 
impact on SGA. 
 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
This section outlines the conclusions drawn from the econometric analyses performed above. Each 
hypothesis developed is addressed individually based on these results. Each hypothesis tested a different variable 
which the literature indicated would mitigate the agency conflict.  
 
The first hypothesis (H1) was that agency costs were inversely related to CEO ownership. The coefficients 
of the CEO ownership (CEO) variable for each univariate and multivariate model with both dependent variables 
were not statistically significant. Given that the coefficients of the CEO variable were not significant in all but one 
model, this hypothesis was rejected in this data set for the time period covered.  
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The second hypotheses (H2) relates to ownership of company stock by outside blockholders. It states 
agency costs are inversely related to blockholder ownership. The blockholder ownership (BH) variable was 
statistically significant (p < 10%) when placed in the multivariate model with asset turnover (ATO) as the dependent 
variable. In this model, the coefficient of the BH variable (β2) was negative, indicating that the efficiency of asset 
utilization decreased as blockholder ownership increased (i.e. agency costs increased, due to the lack of efficient 
asset utilization, as blockholder ownership increased). Under agency theory a negative, statistically significant 
coefficient would be expected in each year in the selling, general, and administrative expenses as a percentage of net 
sales (SGA) model if blockholders were controlling for expenditures for the pecuniary benefit of the manager. 
Therefore, given the lack of statistical significance of the coefficients, the second hypothesis was rejected, in 
general, as BH did not affect for either measure of agency cost, as predicted. 
 
The third hypothesis (H3) stated that agency costs were inversely related to board size. While the 
coefficient of the board size (BOARD) variable was not statistically significant in either univariate or multivariate 
model when regressed against either ATO or SGA. Therefore, the third hypothesis was rejected as there was not 
consistent econometric evidence that the board’s monitoring of agency costs was statistically significant. 
 
The fourth hypothesis (H4) stated that agency costs would be inversely related to board independence 
which was proxied by the proportion of outside directors to total directories. While the degree of board 
independence had a statistically significant (p < 5%) effect on agency costs as measured by asset turnover (ATO) in 
the multivariate model and was positive, as expected, yet it did not have a statistically significant effect on agency 
costs in either univariate or the multivariate model for SGA. Given these results, the fourth hypothesis was rejected 
as outside directors (DIR) did not have a statistically significant effect on agency costs in three of the four models 
run with this variable included as an independent variable. 
 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) stated that agency costs were inversely related to the degree of leverage within the 
firm. The leverage variable (LEV) was not statistically significant in either of the univariate or multivariate analysis 
performed against ATO. LEV was similarly not statistically significant in the univariate model when regressed 
against SGA but was significant (p < 5%) in the multivariate model. Given that LEV was only statistically 
significant in three of the four models, the fifth hypothesis was rejected. 
 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
 The hypotheses were established to test agency theory as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and its 
progeny using variables and methodology developed by Ang, Cole, and Lin (1999) and further developed by Singh 
and Davidson (2003) and Davidson, Bouresli, and Singh (2006). Each hypothesis tested a different variable which 
the literature indicated would mitigate the agency conflict. The data analysis concluded that the governance 
mechanisms traditionally proclaimed by the literature to moderate agency costs did not do so in this data set. 
 
RELEVANCE AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
 The relevance and contribution of this research was two-fold. First, it provides the evidence that 
governance mechanisms were not reducing agency costs in a pre-SOX environment.
8
 It adds to the already 
established stream of literature related to agency theory. Specifically, in the shadow of the corporate scandals of the 
late 20
th
 century and the foreground of the passage of SOX, governance variables which have traditionally been 
viewed as moderators of agency costs appeared to no longer be produce the desired result.  
 
Second, due to the results found above, it provides an analysis which, based on its outcome, is a compelling 
call for further research related to agency costs during the time period before SOX. In a research environment where 
there is significant attention given to SOX and its impact on securities markets, researchers cannot lose sight of their 
role in adding to the body of knowledge to improve corporate behavior. Specifically, given the results above, it is 
crucial for researchers to investigate why the governance mechanisms which, prior to this research, were largely 
                                                 
8 It is not the purpose of this research to argue that SOX was necessary given these results, rather to investigate the environment 
that existed prior to its passage. 
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held to moderate agency costs did not do so in a pre-SOX environment.  History without lessons learned is bound to 
repeat itself. Therefore, it is incumbent upon researchers to learn lessons from this result to prevent it from 
repetition. That is to say that researchers must determine the cause in the diminution of the efficacy of these 
governance mechanisms so we can provide normative solutions for the future and prevent a similar result (whether 
through complacency or outright deception) to occur and, thereby, improve business processes for all. 
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